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IS THERE LIFE AFTER DEATH FOR SPORTS LEAGUE
IMMUNITY? AMERICAN NEEDLE AND BEYOND
MEIR FEDERI
I. INTRODUCTION
For all of the occasional complexity of antitrust law, section 1
of the Sherman Antitrust Act is, in important ways, extraordinary in
its simplicity. Section 1 broadly applies to all concerted activity,
prohibiting all agreements-" [e]very contract, combination . . . or
conspiracy"I-that fail a single ultimate test: "whether the chal-
lenged agreement is one that promotes competition or one that
suppresses competition."2 While that question may sometimes be
answered quickly, such as through per se rules or quick look analysis,
it is an inquiry to which (but for a narrow set of statutory excep-
tions) all concerted conduct is subject-as the Supreme Court has
underscored by rejecting arguments that the special characteristics
of one industry or another exempt it from section 1 scrutiny.3
For decades prior to American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League,4 various professional sports leagues and their members dog-
gedly pursued a variation on this "special characteristics" argument
for antitrust immunity. These leagues argued that the inherent
t Partner, Jones Day. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1989. Meir Feder was one of
the attorneys who represented American Needle in the Supreme Court, and Jones
Day also represented one of the parties in Texaco, Inc. v. Dagher, another case
discussed in this Essay. The views expressed in this Essay are solely his own. Thanks
to Jonathan D. Lamberti for his assistance in the drafting of this Essay, to Chris
Sagers and Abbe Gluck for their invaluable comments, and to the editors of the
Villanova Sports & Entertainment Law Journal for organizing the stimulating sym-
posium at which the thoughts in the Essay were first presented.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
2. Nat'l Soc. of Prof'1 Engineers v. U.S., 435 U.S. 679, 691-92 (1978) ("Engi-
neers") (holding that the Rule of Reason requires courts to determine whether the
challenged restraint promotes or suppresses competition "by analyzing the facts
peculiar to the business, the history of the restraint, and the reasons why it was
imposed," without regard to arguments that competition in a particular industry is
inimical to public interest).
3. See Engineers, 435 U.S. at 689-90 (rejecting exemption argument based on
public safety considerations); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 786-87
(1975) (holding that Congress did not intend to exclude learned professions from
Sherman Act regulation, finding exclusions based on "[t]he nature of an occupa-
tion" alone to be contrary to Congressional intent); but cf id. at 792 n.17 ("[t]he
fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business"
may be relevant to how the Sherman Act is applied).
4. 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010).
(407)
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need for cooperation to produce league sports made league mem-
bers (unlike the members of other, presumably less special, joint
ventures) effectively a "single entity"-and therefore not subject to
section 1, which addresses only agreements among multiple actors.
This argument persisted for decades despite a consistent lack of
success in the lower courts,5 until, in American Needle, the Supreme
Court appeared to put it to rest. Unanimously rejecting any special
sports league exemption from antitrust scrutiny, the court held that
an agreement among separately owned and controlled sports
teams, like all other concerted conduct, must be judged by its com-
petitive effects.6 In short, American Needle appeared to be the end of
the line for what one commentator aptly termed the "holy grail" of
professional sports leagues-the prospect of immunity from section
1 scrutiny.7
Or so, at least, one could be excused for thinking. The immu-
nity argument had barely been interred by American Needle before it
was reincarnated in new and-I will argue-equally meritless
forms.8 Gregory Werden suggests in this volume both that American
Needle left room for a sports league to be treated as a single entity
for certain purposes, and that Texaco Inc. v. Daghe-an earlier case
that expressly declined to address arguments for section 1 immu-
nity-carves out a new zone of "core functions" of sports leagues
and other joint ventures that are exempt from antitrust scrutiny.10
And James Keyte, an antitrust litigator who represents professional
5. See Gabriel Feldman, The Puzzling Persistence of the Single-Entity Argument for
Sports Leagues: American Needle and the Supreme Court's Opportunity to Reject a Flawed
Defense, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 835, 846-47 (2009) (citing L.A. Mem'1 Coliseum Comm'n
v. Nat'1 Football League, 726 F.2d. 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (rejecting single entity
status); Sullivan v. Nat'l Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994)) (noting
lower court decisions that rejected single-entity argument).
6. See Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2212-14 (rejecting NFL's single entity argu-
ments); see also id. at 2216-17 (holding Rule of Reason applicable to NFL and other
joint ventures whose products require some level of cooperation); id. at 2217 n.10
("The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed . . . merely regulates ...
competition or whether it . .. may suppress or even destroy competition.").
7. See Feldman, supra note 5, at 836, 851 (terming single-entity immunity the
"holy grail" for sports leagues because it would exempt them from most antitrust
regulation). Exemption from section 1 scrutiny would leave league members sub-
ject only to the considerably less demanding anti-monopolization provisions of sec-
tion 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2.
8. Or perhaps, if I may push the "holy grail" concept beyond the breaking
point, these new arguments treat the seemingly mortal blow inflicted by American
Needle as in fact "just a flesh wound." MoNTY PYrHON AND THE HOLY GRAIL (Twick-
enham Film Studios 1975).
9. 547 U.S. 1 (2006).
10. See GregoryJ. Werden, American Needle and the Application of the Sherman Act
to Professional Sports Leagues, 18 Vi.L. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 395, 404-06 (2011).
[Vol. 18: p. 407
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sports leagues, has argued for a Dagher-based "core functions" im-
munity so broad as to occupy much of the space previously filled by
the now-discredited "single entity" argument."
This Essay argues that these new theories of sports league im-
munity-the "B Team" of immunity arguments, one might call
them-are no more persuasive than the "A Team" arguments unan-
imously routed in American Needle. Part I summarizes the American
Needle case. Part II explores what was at stake in the case and its
implications for future sports league immunity arguments. Part III
addresses, and takes issue with, Werden's and Keyte's arguments
that a zone of immunity for sports leagues survives American Needle.
II. AMERICAN NEEDLE
Prior to 2000, the National Football League ("NFL") teams had
jointly licensed the individual teams' trademarks-primarily
through an entity they controlled known as National Football
League Properties, Inc. ("NFLP")-to multiple licensees. In 2000,
the teams voted to enter into an exclusive contract with Reebok to
make, among other things, trademarked headwear. When Ameri-
can Needle, which had been one of the nonexclusive licensees,
challenged this action as a violation of section 1, the NFL teams
argued that they were a "single entity" immune from section 1 scru-
tiny under Copperweld Corp. v. Independent Tube Corp.,12 which held
that a parent corporation and its wholly-owned subsidiary are effec-
tively a single enterprise whose components are incapable of an
"agreement" subject to section 1.13 American Needle responded
that Copperweld was an intentionally narrow decision premised on,
and limited to, the intrinsic unity of a parent and wholly-owned sub-
sidiary: an "agreement" between such entities cannot meaningfully
limit competition, according to Copperweld, because " [w] ith or with-
out a formal 'agreement,' the subsidiary acts for the benefit of the
parent, its sole shareholder."' 4 The District Court took the defend-
ants' view and entered summary judgment in their favor.
The Seventh Circuit affirmed. Notwithstanding Copperweld's
reasoning emphasizing that "a parent and a wholly owned subsidi-
ary always have a 'unity of purpose or a common design' "I 5-such
11. SeeJames A. Keyte, American Needle- A New Quick Look forJoint Ventures, 25
ANTrrRUST 48, 51-52 (2010).
12. 467 U.S. 752 (1984)
13. See id. (holding that parent and subsidiary corporation were single enter-
prise whose members cannot "agree" for purposes of section 1).
14. Id. at 771-72.
15. Id. at 772 (citation omitted).
409
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that an agreement between them could not eliminate any indepen-
dence that would otherwise exist-the Seventh Circuit held that the
potentially divergent interests of the NFL teams did not prevent
them from being a single entity under Coppenveld.1 6 The key ques-
tion, to the Seventh Circuit, was not whether the teams were capa-
ble of independence, but whether they were "one source of
economic power."' 7 The court did not define what constitutes a
single "source of economic power," but concluded that the need
for a degree of cooperation to produce football games meant that
"the NFL teams can function only as one source of economic power
when collectively producing NFL football." Positing that trade-
marks are used to promote football, the court further concluded
that "only one source of economic power controls the promotion of
NFL football."1 8
On appeal to the Supreme Court, the parties again joined issue
on the scope of the Copperweld doctrine. In addition, the Court was
presented by the Department ofJustice with a compromise position
of sorts, which the Government labeled an "effective merger" analy-
sis. The Government proposed that joint ventures like sports
leagues could be treated as single entities when two conditions were
met:
First, the teams and the league must have effectively
merged the relevant aspect of their potential operations,
thereby eliminating actual or potential competition
among the teams and between the teams and the league
in that operational sphere. Second, the challenged re-
straint must not significantly affect actual or potential
competition among the teams or between the teams and
the league outside their merged operations.' 9
Where both prongs are satisfied, under this approach, the ven-
ture's actions would be treated as those of a single entity. However,
16. See Am. Needle Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir.
2008).
17. Id. at 743.
It thus follows that only one source of economic power controls the pro-
motion of NFL football; it makes little sense to assert that each individual
team has the authority, if not the responsibility, to promote the jointly
produced NFL football . .. [t]he NFL teams share a vital economic inter-
est in collectively promoting NFL football.
Id.
18. Id.
19. Brief of United States as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Am. Needle
v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), available at http://
wwwjustice.gov/atr/cases/f250300/250316.htm [Hereinafter Brief of U.S.].
[Vol. 18: p. 407
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the Government added-seemingly negating much of the practical
effect of this test-that even in such cases, the plaintiff would ordi-
narily be able to challenge the "effective merger" itself, i.e., the
original "eliminat[ion of] actual or potential competition" that cre-
ated the effective merger in the first place. 20
The Supreme Court unanimously reversed, in an opinion by
Justice Stevens that reiterated the applicability of section 1 to all
agreements between independently owned and controlled enti-
ties.2 ' The Court framed the key question as whether the alleged
agreement "joins together separate decisionmakers" capable of
making independent decisions-that is, whether the parties to the
agreement are "separate economic actors pursuing separate eco-
nomic interests," such that the agreement "deprives the market-
place of independent centers of decisionmaking . . . and thus of
actual or potential competition."2 2 The Court-citing cases like
United States v. Sealy, Inc.,23 in which even a single corporation was
held subject to section 1 because the corporation was "controlled by
a group of competitors" 24-emphasized that this question turns on
substance (whether entities with distinct interests are involved)
rather than the form of the entity.2 5
Under this analysis, the Court held that the separate interests
of the NFL teams precluded their treatment as a single enterprise
immune from section 1: "NFL teams do not possess either the uni-
tary decisionmaking quality or the single aggregation of economic
power," and each team has a "separate corporate consciousness." 26
The Court dismissed the relevance of the argument that coopera-
tion is necessary to form a sports league, observing that "[tlhejusti-
fication for cooperation is not relevant to whether the cooperation
is concerted or independent action."27 So long as the NFL teams
were independent actors with independent interests, their agree-
ment to license collectively "deprive[d] the marketplace of inde-
pendent centers of decisionmaking" and fell within section 1.28
20. Id.
21. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2206-16
(2010).
22. Id. at 2207-08.
23. 388 U.S. 350 (1967).
24. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2209.
25. Id. at 2209-10.
26. Id. at 2212 (identifying NFL teams as "substantial, independently owned,
independently managed businesses").
27. Id. at 2214.
28. See id. (quoting Copperweld Corp. v. Indep. Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 769
(1984)).
411
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Nor, the Court held, did it matter that the teams had formed a
nominally unitary entity in NFLP, because "competitors 'cannot
simply get around' antitrust liability by acting 'through a third-party
intermediary or joint venture.' "29
The Court likewise gave short shrift to the "effective merger"
theory presented by the Solicitor General, observing in a footnote
that even under "the Government's own standard" the agreements
at issue "would constitute concerted action," and that in any event
the decisions of NFLP "are for all functional purposes choices made
by the 32 entities with potentially competing interests."so
Finally, the Court observed that the applicability of section 1
hardly portends disaster for sports leagues like the NFL, because
simply subjecting them to antitrust scrutiny does not mean their
agreements are necessarily unlawful: "Football teams that need to
cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law."3' The Court noted that
special characteristics of a sports league may justify certain agree-
ments as procompetitive rather than anticompetitive under the
Rule of Reason. Further, borrowing language associated with its so-
called "quick look" cases, the Court observed that the Rule of Rea-
son analysis "'can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an
eye' "32- Signaling that in appropriate cases legality under the Rule
of Reason might be easily demonstrated. At the same time, the
Court cautioned, the "the conduct at issue . . . is still concerted
activity under the Sherman Act that is subject to §1 analysis."3 3
III. UNDERSTANDING AMERICAN NEEDLE, AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
FOR ANTITRUST IMMUNITIES
American Needle was, at bottom, a battle between two views of
Copperweld. American Needle argued, in essence, that Copperweld
was a narrow case about entities that are incapable of meaningful
independent action. From an antitrust standpoint, no meaningful
"contract, combination . . . or conspiracy"34 between such entities is
possible, because with or without an agreement the entities are
owned and controlled by a single decisionmaker. In this view, Cop-
perweld is limited to entities that, like a parent and wholly-owned
29. See id. at 2215-16 (quoting Major League Baseball Props., Inc. v. Salvino,
Inc., 542 F.3d 290, 336 (2d Cir. 2008)) (Sotomayor,J., concurring) (addressing use
of third-party intermediaries or joint ventures).
30. Id. at 2216 n.9.
31. Id. at 2216.
32. Id. at 2217 (quoting NCAA, 468 U. S. at 109 n.39).
33. Id. at 2216.
34. Sherman Antitrust Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1890).
[Vol. 18: p. 407
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subsidiary, inherently have "a complete unity of interest."3 5 All
other entities are capable of independent action, and their agree-
ments are therefore subject to section 1 scrutiny to determine
whether the agreements unreasonably eliminate that independent
action.
The Seventh Circuit, and the NFL, took a much broader view
of Copperweld, interpreting the decision as applying even to entities
that are capable of competing with each other. Copperweld, under
this approach, requires a somewhat metaphysical inquiry into
whether the multiple entities at issue can be understood as a "single
source of economic power." In this view, the need for cooperation
to play football games-the NFL argued that "the member clubs of
a professional sports league are inherently unable to compete at
all" without collaboration-was enough to make the NFL teams
"one source of economic power," and therefore exempt from sec-
tion 1 under Copperweld even in areas (like trademark licensing)
where they were capable of competing.3 6
The Supreme Court definitively resolved this tug-of-war in
favor of the narrow interpretation of Copperweld, expressly disap-
proving any "metaphysical" inquiry into "whether the parties in-
volved 'seem' like one firm or multiple firms."37 Rather, so long as
an "agreementjoins together 'independent centers of decisionmak-
ing,' . . . the entities are capable of conspiring under § 1, and the
court must decide whether the restraint of trade is an unreasonable
and therefore illegal one."3 8 In short, the Court held that the joint
conduct of "substantial, independently owned, and independently
managed business[es]" with distinct interests simply is not single
entity conduct under Copperweld.3 9
This holding is an important one, but there is nothing about
the decision that should be seen as surprising. Indeed, much as I
would like to portray Ameican Needle as a startling upset that re-
sulted solely from my firm's brilliant lawyering, it would be more
accurate to say that the decision was (or at least should have been)
35. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 771.
36. See Brief of Respondent, American Needle, Inc. v. National Football
League, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010) (No. 08-661), 2009 WL 3865438. See also Am. Nee-
dle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 743 (7th Cir. 2008) ("Asserting
that a single football team could produce a football game is less of a legal argu-
ment than it is a Zen riddle: Who wins when a football team plays itself").
37. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2211-12.
38. Id. at 2211-12 (quoting Copperweld, 467 U.S. 752 (1984)).
39. See id. at 2212 (discussing decision-making of NFL teams).
413
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a predictable one.4 0 Understanding what made it predictable,
moreover, goes a long way toward demonstrating the flaws of the
next generation of arguments for sports league immunity. It is for
this reason that it is worth exploring why the Court had to decide
the case as it did-not to relitigate it, but rather to lay a foundation
for spotting the ways in which the same issues recur in the newly-
crafted immunity arguments.
First, one of the enduring puzzles of the NFL's (and the Sev-
enth Circuit's) argument-that sports leagues are exempt from sec-
tion 1 because such leagues inherently require some degree of
cooperation-is that it always seemed flatly inconsistent with Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents41 (NCAA) (a
case decided within days of Copperweld). In NCAA, the Court
squarely addressed the need for cooperation among members of a
sports league, and how that need affects antitrust analysis."2 The
consequence of that need, the Court explained, is that agreements
within such leagues are subject to Rule of Reason, rather than per se,
scrutiny."3 The Court did not say such leagues should be immune
under section 1; to the contrary, the Court emphasized that, not-
withstanding any need for cooperation, 'joint ventures have no im-
munity from the antitrust laws.""4 It is hard to see how the Court
40. There was no shortage of predictions that the Supreme Court would af-
firm the Seventh Circuit. Sixty percent of the respondents at the FantasySCOTUS
website predicted an affirmance. SeeJosh Blackman, Fantasy SCOTUS: Predictions for
Bilski, American Needle, Stop the Beach, PCAOB, Black, and Graham, ABOVETHE
LAW.cOM (March 26, 2010, 4:05 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2010/03/fantasy
scotus-predictions-for-bilski-american-needle-stop-the-beach-pcaob-black-and-gra-
ham/#. See also Chrisopher Sagers, American Needle, Dagher, and the Evolving Anti-
trust Theory of the Firm: What Will Become of Section 1?, ANTITRUST SOURCE, Aug. 2009
(online publication of ABA Section of Antitrust Law), available at http://www.aba
net.org/antitrust/at-source/09/08/AugO9-Sagers8-12f.pdf. To be sure, this proba-
bly tells us more about the heuristics used in predicting the outcome of Supreme
Court cases-e.g., looking to the Court's recent trend of ruling for antitrust de-
fendants, or characterizations of the Court as "pro-business"-than it does about
whether the decision was predictable as a matter of antitrust law.
To be clear, I am not suggesting that advocacy played no role in the case-to
the contrary, I am (unsurprisingly) quite proud of my firm's work in the case, and
I firmly believe that effective advocacy can be critical to making clear why a particu-
lar result is necessarily correct. But by the same token I think it is important to be
clear that the Court's decision was far more consistent with established antitrust
law, properly understood, than was the alternative.
41. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
42. See NCAA, 486 U.S. at 117.
43. See id. at 100-01.
44. Id. at 113.
[Vol. 18: p. 407
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could have accepted the NFL's "need to cooperate" argument as a
basis for immunity without effectively overruling NCAA. 45
More generally, NCAA is but one example of the Court's con-
sistent refusal to carve out specific industries or types of conduct as
antitrust-free zones. Even where the Court has recognized that po-
tential procompetitive justifications make per se liability inappropri-
ate, the Court has consistently refrained from taking the further
step of immunizing the conduct entirely. In addition to NCAA, ex-
amples include Broadcast Music Inc. v. Columbia Broadcast System, Inc.
(Broadcast Music) ,46 Northwest Wholesale Stationers v. Pacific Stationery
6& Printing Co. (Northwest Wholesale Stationers) ,47 and (at least if read
literally, as I believe it should be) Dagher. Simply put, the Court has
consistently refused to turn potential justifications for collaboration
among potential competitors into blanket immunities.48
Second, and not unrelated, whether leagues members need to
cooperate in some respects-or may in some metaphysical sense
constitute a "single source of power"-has strikingly little to do with
the lodestar of all antitrust doctrine: whether the conduct at issue
"promotes competition or . . . suppresses competition."4 9 The
NFL's argument, in other words, was not an argument that the con-
duct it sought to immunize would never be anticompetitive.
Rather, it was an argument that the conduct should be immune
from scrutiny even if the conduct is overtly anticompetitive, i.e.,
that Copperweld creates a zone of immunity broad enough to apply
even to agreements that overtly eliminate competition from the
marketplace. The Seventh Circuit, it is worth recalling, applied sin-
45. The NFL argued that NCAA could be distinguished as dealing with college
rather than professional leagues, but it is hard to see why this should make a differ-
ence. Moreover, NCAA itself made clear that it regarded the NCAA as indistin-
guishable from other sports leagues. See NCAA, 468 U.S. at 100-01.
46. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
47. 472 U.S. 284 (1985).
48. Copperweld, as will be seen, is fully consistent with this assertion. As Ameri-
can Needle argued, and as I briefly address in further detail, the key to Copperweld
is that a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary have no potential for meaningful
independence or competition. The case did not immunize any conduct re-
straining competition that (but for the restraint) would otherwise exist.
49. Nat'l Soc'y of Prof'1 Eng'rs. v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 691 (1978)
[Engineers]. The "need to cooperate" argument also, as Justice Stevens observed,
does not speak to the distinction between unilateral and concerted action: "[t]he
justification for cooperation is not relevant to whether that cooperation is con-
certed or independent action." Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S.
Ct. 2201, 2214 (2010).
415
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gle-entity immunity despite recognizing that trademark licensing
was an area in which the teams were capable of competing.5 0
It should have been clear (as it was to most courts that ad-
dressed sports league single-entity arguments prior to American Nee-
dle) that this was an untenable reading of Coppeweld, both in view of
the Coppenveld opinion itself and even more importantly-particu-
larly for the next generation of arguments for sports league immu-
nity-because the notion of an immunity without regard to
competitive effects is so foreign to the entire sweep of antitrust law.
Absent a constitutional imperative51 or specific congressional in-
tent, the Supreme Court has consistently insisted that antitrust
questions be analyzed-and antitrust doctrines justified-solely by
reference to competitive effects. The Court has repeatedly rejected
arguments that other considerations should override this focus on
competitive effects, to the point that even public safety considera-
tions cannot justify an exemption from this "basic policy of the
Sherman Act."52
Copperweld, even though not articulated as a doctrine of com-
petitive effects, nicely illustrates the primacy of such effects even in
drawing the boundary between concerted and unilateral conduct.
It is here that I part company with Professor Sagers, who apparently
sees Coppenveld as (at least at some level) indifferent to competitive
effects, indeed as "pretty plainly" inviting the lower courts to push
50. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 538 F.3d 736, 737-38 (7th
Cir. 2008) (explaining court's analysis). To be sure, the NFL and the Seventh
Circuit both suggested that the NFL's licensing restraints could be procompetitive,
arguing primarily that they made the NFL a more effective competitor against
other forms of entertainment. See id. at 742-43 (stating court's reasoning). But
neither seriously argued that these effects were so plainly procompetitive as to sat-
isfy the usual standards for determining the competitive effects of a particular type
of agreement on a per se basis. And in the absence of such a showing, NFL team
agreements could not properly be declared automatically lawful on the basis of
their procompetitive effects.
51. For example, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, which immunizes actions
seeking to influence the passage or enforcement of laws, is based on First Amend-
ment considerations, including the right to petition the government for the re-
dress of grievances. See City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., Inc., 499 U.S. 365,
380 (1991) (quoting E..LR. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S.
127, 141 (1961)).
52. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 695. Likewise, even when procompetitive benefits
are held to justify a degree of cooperation among competitors, such exceptions to
the "otherwise inflexible prohibition of agreements eliminating rivalry" are "con-
fin [ed] ... to the ... reason for [their] existence." ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTI-
TRusT PARADOx 267 (1978). As judge Posner has written, "[i]t does not follow that
because two firms sometimes have a cooperative relationship there are no competi-
tive gains from forbidding them to cooperate in ways that yield no economies but
simply limit competition." Gen. Leaseways, Inc. v. Nat'l Truck Leasing Ass'n, 744
F.2d 588, 594 (7th Cir. 1984).
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the single entity concept beyond the parent-subsidiary context by
"develop [ing] some theory of the firm" that may or may not have a
clear relationship to competitive effects.53 While there is much
common ground between us-as a normative matter, I fully agree
with him that a single-entity immunity extending to anticompetitive
agreements cannot be justified-I do not think Coppenreld could
fairly be read, even before American Needle, as creating or inviting
any such competition-indifferent immunity.
The core of Coppenveld is its (intrinsically narrow) reasoning
that an "agreement" between a parent and wholly owned subsidi-
ary-just like coordination between a company and its unincorpo-
rated division-cannot possibly eliminate independent action from
the marketplace.54 In each case, regardless of whether there is any
formal agreement, there is inherently a "complete unity of interest"
that precludes meaningful independence.55 The "agreement," as
the Court carefully emphasized, therefore eliminates no competi-
tion or independent conduct that might otherwise exist:
For similar reasons [to those applicable to an unincorpo-
rated division], the coordinated activity of a parent and its
wholly owned subsidiary must be viewed as that of a single
enterprise for purposes of § 1 of the Sherman Act. A par-
ent and its wholly owned subsidiary have a complete unity
of interest. Their objectives are common, not disparate;
their general corporate actions are guided or determined
not by two separate corporate consciousnesses, but one.
They are not unlike a multiple team of horses drawing a
vehicle under the control of a single driver. With or with-
out a formal "agreement," the subsidiary acts for the bene-
fit of the parent, its sole shareholder. If a parent and a
wholly owned subsidiary do "agree" to a course of action,
53. Prof. Sagers was a panelist at the same symposium that resulted in this
article and also wrote an article published in Volume 18, Issue 2 of this lawjournal.
See Chris Sagers, Why Copperweld Was Actually Kind of Dumb: Sound, Fury, and the
Once and Still Missing Antitrust Theory of the Firm, 18 ViLL. SPORTs & ENT. L.J. 377
(2011).
54. The Copperweld Court explained at length that a wholly-owned subsidiary
was not meaningfully different from an unincorporated division. See Capperweld,
467 U.S. at 770-71 (noting "general agreement that § 1 is not violated by the inter-
nally coordinated conduct of a corporation and one of its unincorporated divi-
sions"). Notably, the entire argument of the petitioner in Copperweld was that there
was no basis in antitrust policy for treating a wholly-owned subsidiary differently
from an unincorporated division. See Brief of Petitioner, Copperweld v. Indepen-
dence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752 (1984) No. 82-1260.
55. See Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp., 467 U.S. 752, 771
(1984).
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there is no sudden joining of economic resources that had
previously served different interests, and there is no justifi-
cation for § 1 scrutiny.
Indeed, the very notion of an "agreement" in Sherman Act
terms between a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary lacks mean-
ing .... [I]n reality a parent and a wholly owned subsidiary always
have a "unity of purpose or a common design." They share a com-
mon purpose whether or not the parent keeps a tight rein over the
subsidiary; the parent may assert full control at any moment if the
subsidiary fails to act in the parent's best interests.5 6
I do not think this reasoning can fairly be read as permitting
an open-ended quest for a "theory of the firm"-or, indeed, as sup-
porting single-entity immunity for any agreement between entities
that are capable of competing with each other (or otherwise acting
independently). That is, the Copperweld Court was quite clear that
the absence of any potential for competition was essential to its
holding that "there is no justification for § 1 scrutiny."5 7
In seeing Coppeneld-notwithstanding this reasoning-as invit-
ing a broad and open-ended "theory of the firm," Professor Sagers
may be taking his cue from a few broad lower court interpretations
of Coppeweld rather than from Coppenveld itself.58 Even in the lower
courts, moreover, I am far from convinced that there has been a
systematic problem with courts seeing Copperweld as malleable
enough tojustify immunity for agreements between entities that are
capable of competing with each other. To the contrary, I think
Judge Kozinski was correct in observing that most courts presented
with single-entity arguments "have required ... that the constituent
entities be neither actual nor potential competitors."5 9 That is not
56. Id. at 771-72 (emphasis added).
57. Id. at 772.
58. My disagreement with Professor Sagers, to be clear, is limited to our re-
spective views of Coppenreld. I think we are largely in agreement on what I see as
the more important issue: that a broad immunity defined without regard to com-
petitive effects is inconsistent with the goals of antitrust law.
59. Freeman v. San Diego Ass'n of Realtors, 322 F.3d 1133, 1149 (9th Cir.
2003). Judge Boudin, in his thoughtful opinion in Fraser, made the related obser-
vation that there is "not a lot" of circuit court case law expanding Copperweld be-
yond its factual setting. See Fraser v. Major League Soccer, LLC, 284 F.3d 47, 58
n.6 (1st Cir. 2002). His opinion also suggested that any attempt to do so would be
fraught with difficulty and inferior to straightforward analysis under the Rule of
Reason. See id. at 59. Once one goes beyond the classic single enterprise, includ-
ing Copperweld situations, it is difficult to find an easy stopping point or even decide
on the proper functional criteria for hybrid cases. To the extent the criteria reflect
judgments that a particular practice in context is defensible, assessment under sec-
tion 1 is more straightforward and draws on developed law. Id.
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to deny that there are marginal cases in which the result required
by Copperweld is less than completely clear. 60 But to say that such
close-to-the-line cases exist is a far cry from saying that the lower
courts have seen Copperweld as inviting an open-ended "theory of
the firm" inquiry so broad as to authorize immunity even for agree-
ments to restrict competition.
More importantly, even if certain lower courts may have per-
ceived such an invitation in Copperweld, that hardly establishes that
these courts were reading Copperweld correctly. Indeed, the prime
example of such a broad reading of Copperweld-Judge Easter-
brook's opinion in Chicago Professional Sports, LP v. NBA61 (Bulls
17)-fairly obviously makes little effort to parse the opinion in Cop-
perweld.6 2 This is unsurprising in light of how carefully Copperweld
itself emphasized that its parent-subsidiary immunity resulted from
the conclusion that truly independent action by a wholly-owned
subsidiary was inherently impossible .63
60. Copperweld's implications for majority-but-less-than-100%-owned subsidiar-
ies, for example, have not been free from doubt.
61. 95 F.3d 593 (7th Cir. 1996).
62. See id. at 598. Judge Easterbrook declined to accept that Copperweld re-
quired a "complete unity of interest," based not on any analysis of Copperweld, but
on the ground that he deemed such a criterion "silly," since "even a single firm
contains many competing interests." Id. This refusal to accept Coppenveld's stated
reasoning is far from persuasive evidence of what Copperweld actually said.
It is also worth noting one obvious response to Judge Easterbrook's observation:
the entire point of Copperweld is that potentially competing interests at lower levels
of a firm are irrelevant when there is unitary control of the firm's actions in the
marketplace. See Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 769-72 (discussing irrelevance of compet-
ing interest at lower levels of firm); see also, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, ExclusiveJoint
Ventures and Antitrust Policy, 1 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 1, 54 (1995) ("[N]eoclassical
price theory regards the firm as a profit-maximizing entity and does not give any
special consideration to the conflicting preferences of its managers or other em-
ployees."). That individual employees within a firm may have competing interests
hardly makes it "silly" to draw a distinction (as Copperweld plainly does), between
entities that have a complete unity of interest-because they are unitarily owned
and controlled-and those that do not. As Copperweld emphasizes, only the former
are incapable of meaningful independent action, and therefore only as to the for-
mer is there "no justification for § 1 scrutiny." Coppenreld, 467 U.S. at 772.
63. None of this is to suggest that Copperweld was a flawlessly-written opinion.
In particular, the opinion courts confusion by framing its analysis as one that fa-
vored "substance" or "reality" over "form." Copperweld, 467 U.S. at 772. This fram-
ing was unfortunate, because substance-over-form, at least in the abstract, can be
read to suggest an open-ended, standard-based rather than rule-based, inquiry. (It
is doubly unfortunate that American Needle perpetuated this substance versus form
framing. See Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2211
(2010).) But this would be a misunderstanding, because in the Copperweld taxon-
omy a parent's one-hundred percent ownership of a subsidiary is a matter of "sub-
stance," not one of "form." What the Court meant by "reality" and "substance" was
the reality that a wholly-owned subsidiary is not meaningfully distinct from its par-
ent, as contrasted with the "form" of treating the subsidiary as separate merely
because of the formality of separate incorporation. See, e.g. Copperweld, 467 U.S. at
419
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From this perspective, it was always hard to imagine the Su-
preme Court adopting an understanding of Copperweld that would
create a section I exemption for agreements among potential com-
petitors-whether based on a "theory of the firm" or on some meta-
physical notion of a single "source of economic power"-and it can
hardly be surprising that the Court decisively rejected that option.
American Needle reminds us that there is little room in antitrust law
for arguments that diverge from a focus on whether competition is
being unreasonably restrained. That inquiry, as the Court empha-
sized, need not be a painful one for antitrust defendants: "the Rule
of Reason may not require a detailed analysis; it 'can sometimes be
applied in the twinkling of an eye' [-and, indeed, restraints that]
'are essential if the product is to be available at all,"' like sports
league agreements on the rules of play, are "likely to survive the
Rule of Reason."64 But the Court's willingness to entertain such
arguments remains confined to applications of competitive effects
analysis, not arguments for avoiding it.
IV. LiFE AFTER DEATH?
On its face, American Needle broadly ruled out "single entity"
status for sports leagues and other joint ventures of "substantial, in-
dependently owned, and independently managed business [es] ."65
Where a venture is controlled by independent entities with poten-
tially distinct interests, any agreement among them represents the
joining together of potentially independent economic forces and,
therefore, constitutes concerted action subject to section 1. The
Court's opinion therefore appears to leave little room for ongoing
efforts to apply single-entity immunity to such joint ventures of enti-
ties lacking what Copperweld described as a "complete unity of
interest."66
771-73 (illustrating this distinction). As the Government's amicus brief in American
Needle noted, in the relevant sense separate ownership "is notjust a matter of form,
but creates 'functional differences' that are 'significant for antitrust policy."' Brief
of U.S., supra note 19, at 23.
64. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2217 (quoting NCAA, 468 U. S. at 109 n. 39).
65. Id. at 2212.
66. The one area in which a modest expansion of Coppenueld appears possible
is one consistent with this "complete unity of interest" criterion, exemplified by the
question the Court declined to reach in Dagher. Dagher involved a fully integrated
joint venture in which the participants-while independent entities in other mar-
kets-completely eliminated any distinct interests in the conduct of the joint ven-
ture, such that the venture was arguably a fully independent entity to which the
participants related solely "as investors, not competitors." Texaco Inc. v. Dagher,
547 U.S. 1, 6 (2006). The Dagher Court declined to address this fact-specific single
entity argument, see id. at 7 n.2, and the argument has little relevance to more
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Not everyone, however, has accepted that American Needle fore-
closes arguments for sports league immunity. Gregory Werden and
James Keyte, in particular, have articulated theories under which
significant areas of immunity for sports leagues remain viable even
after American Needle. This Section identifies and addresses those
theories, which I believe to be fundamentally flawed.
A. The Case-By-Case "Effective Merger" Theory
Gregory Werden reads American Needle's rejection of single en-
tity immunity for sports leagues like the NFL as only partial. In
particular, he sees the case as suggesting approval of single-entity
treatment forjoint ventures, including sports leagues, in a variety of
circumstances, such as "when [the venture's] participants have no
material interests outside the venture" and "when its participants
can be expected to maximize the venture's profits rather than act
on interests they do have outside the venture."67 In this view, Ameri-
can Needle invites a case-by-case inquiry into whether the venture
participants have interests that are identical or divergent with re-
spect to the restraint at issue, and the same joint venture can be a
collective (and therefore subject to section 1) in one case and a
single entity (and therefore exempt) in another.68 Mr. Werden,
who is Senior Economic Counsel for the Antitrust Division of the
Department ofJustice, goes on to suggest that this case-by-case anal-
ysis be performed by applying the "effective merger" test proposed
by the Solicitor General in American Needle.6 9 That test would ask:
typical joint ventures (including sports leagues) in which the participants retain
distinct interests that go beyond those of mere investors.
67. Werden, supra note 10. Mr. Werden cites the example of a professional
services partnership, believing that "American Needle suggests that the partners do
not engage in concerted action when they set a schedule of fees for the firm." Id.
It is worth noting that the assumption that law firm partnerships (for example) do
not engage in concerted conduct is not universally shared. See, e.g., Rothery Stor-
age & Van Co. v. Atlas Van Lines, Inc., 792 F.2d 210, 224 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1986)
(dicta) (treating law firms as subject to section 1 scrutiny); BoRK, supra note 52, at
265-67 (same). Moreover, some firms have compensation structures under which
individual partners' interests may be served by a course of conduct that does not
maximize the firm's overall profits. See Hovenkamp, supra note 62, at 64 ("[T]he
individual members ofjoint ventures often have incentives that diverge from those
of the venture as a whole."). The question is, in any event, of little practical signifi-
cance: for a variety of reasons-including but not limited to lack of market
power-the decisions of a single law firm will rarely be subject to any plausible
antitrust challenge.
68. See Werden, supra note 10 (discussing American Needle opinion).
69. See id. at 402-03. (advocating application of "effective merger" test in such
cases).
421
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[W]hether the joint venture's participants had "effectively
merged the relevant aspect of their operations, thereby
eliminating actual and potential competition" in the rele-
vant market. If so, the court could ask whether the partic-
ular actions at issue nevertheless "significantly affect actual
or potential competition among" the participants in some
related market.70
This suggestion is problematic in a number of ways. As an ini-
tial matter, the notion that a joint venture should be treated as a
single entity whenever its members "can be expected to maximize
the venture's profits rather than act on interests they do have
outside the venture,"71 is troubling, and seemingly inconsistent with
American Needle itself. As the Court observed, a shared interest in
maximizing profitability is as typical of cartels as of legitimate joint
ventures: "If the fact that potential competitors shared in profits or
losses from a venture meant that the venture was immune from § 1,
then any cartel could evade the antitrust law simply by creating a
'joint venture' to serve as the exclusive seller of their competing
products."72
Second, the "effective merger" notion turns what is more prop-
erly treated as essentially a status determination-whether the enti-
ties at issue are distinct actors or (as in Copperweld) inherently
unitary-into a case-by-case examination of the effects of particular
agreements. To be sure, Copperweld considered competitive effects
in drawing the boundary between unilateral and concerted con-
duct, but that did not change the fact that the Court was defining a
status-whether a parent and its wholly-owned subsidiary are one
entity or two for purposes of the threshold plurality-of-actors re-
quirement of section 1-and doing so on the ground that the sub-
sidiary is always incapable of independent action.73 Appreciating
the rationale for turning this status question into an inquiry for
which the answer will vary from case to case for a single joint ven-
ture is difficult. Equally difficult is understanding why-in cases in
which it can be determined at the threshold that no actual or po-
tential competition is at issue-the case could not readily be dis-
70. Id. at 403.
71. Id. at 401.
72. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2215 (2010)
(citation omitted).
73. See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text.
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missed under traditional antitrust principles rather than requiring
the crafting of an entirely new "effective merger" defense.7 4
Third, as the Court apparently recognized when it dismissed
the Solicitor General's proposal in a footnote,'7 5 it is not evident
what the proposed effective merger test-with all of the complica-
tion inherent in litigating this additional issue-would accomplish.
As the Solicitor General conceded, even if the defendants can show
that they had "effectively merged" by eliminating competition
among themselves, a plaintiff would generally be permitted to challenge
that earlier elimination of competition under the Rule ofReason.76 Indeed,
in such a case, it is precisely that prior elimination of competition
that normally will be the focus of the antitrust case. In American
Needle, for example, the putative "effective merger" was the NFL
teams' original agreement to cease competing in trademark licens-
ing and license only through NFLP-but that very agreement not
to compete was at the core of the antitrust challenge to the teams'
conduct.
B. The Dagher "Core Activity" Argument
Mr. Werden also addresses another potential argument for par-
tial sports league immunity, suggesting that a statement in Texaco,
Inc. v. Dagher-the Court's observation that antitrust's ancillary re-
straints doctrine "has no application" when "the business practice
being challenged involves the core activity of the joint venture it-
self"-can be read to immunize the "core activity" of ajoint venture
like a sports league.77 Putting aside for the moment the merit of
this suggestion-and I believe it to be a misreading of Dagher-Mr.
Werden at least takes a modest view of what might be such a "core
activity," using the example of a hypothetical Major League Base-
ball decision to move from a 162-game to a 154-game schedule.7 8
Here, too, it is difficult to see any need for the creation of such an
immunity-if there has been a plague of antitrust litigation over
league scheduling decisions, I am unaware of it-but at least the
74. This is particularly true in the aftermath of Bell Atlantic Corp. v.
Twombly, which sanctioned the dismissal of implausible claims. See Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (requiring "enough facts to state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.").
75. See Am. Needle, 130 S.Ct. at 2216 n.9.
76. See Brief for U.S., supra note 19, at 16, 28, 32 (conceding potential for
Rule of Reason challenge).
77. See Werden, supra note 10, at 404-05 (discussing Dagher 547 U.S. at 7).
78. See id.
423
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harm from such a narrow immunity, however unsound, would likely
be inconsequential.
The problem, however, is the ancient one of the camel's nose
in the tent, particularly in light of the inherent vagueness of the
phrase "core activity." Indeed, the camel may already be in the
tent: James Keyte (an antitrust litigator who represents professional
sports leagues) has argued that, combining American Needle's "quick
look" language with Dagher's discussion of "core" activities, even
such far-reaching restraints as broadcast restrictions and salary caps
are essentially immune from antitrust scrutiny.79 Mr. Keyte's argu-
ment runs as follows: (1) American Needle, in noting that the Rule of
Reason "'can sometimes be applied in the twinkling of an eye,'
approved the application of a "quick look" determination in favor
of antitrust defendants in appropriate cases; (2) "American Needle
arguably indicates" that the "'core' venture activities" of which
Dagher spoke "could be approved on a 'quick look;"' and (3) a host
of sports league restraints-indeed, a veritable owners' wish list-
can be termed "core," and as such approved without detailed anti-
trust analysis.80
Before addressing in detail why neither Dagher nor American
Needle can be read to support this ambitious argument, it is worth
pausing to observe that-notwithstanding the superficial differ-
ences between this argument and the one rejected in American Nee-
dle-the argument's essence is yet another attempt to exempt
sports leagues from the single, universally-applicable question that
must be asked under section 1: "whether the challenged agreement
is one that promotes competition or one that suppresses competi-
tion."81 Unlike traditional "quick look" scrutiny-which is merely a
means of applying the Rule of Reason quickly when the result of
such scrutiny is obviouS82-the question of whether something may
be deemed a "core activity" of a sports league (or other joint ven-
ture) simply does not speak to whether it is procompetitive or an-
ticompetitive; it is yet another attempt to substitute a quasi-
metaphysical concept-with "core activity" replacing "one source of
economic power" as the metaphysical concept of choice-for the
79. See Keyte, supra note 11, at 51-52 (arguing that "core" activities of profes-
sional sports leagues do not fall within purview of antitrust scrutiny).
80. Id. at 51-52.
81. Engineers, 435 U.S. at 691.
82. See Cal. Dental Ass'n v. F.T.C, 526 U.S. 756, 770 (1999) (holding that
more thorough analysis not required when anticompetitive effects are obvious).
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competitive effects analysis required by section 1.8 As described
earlier, such efforts to define a zone of antitrust immunity without
regard to competitive effects have, with good reason, been rejected
by the Supreme Court.
In any event, the "core activity" argument misreads Dagher and
American Needle as thoroughly as the single entity argument misread
Coppeneld. As an initial matter, the notion that Dagher supports any
sort of immunity for joint ventures is refuted by Dagher itself. Dagher
unanimously reversed a Ninth Circuit decision holding that a joint
venture's setting of a price for its product was a per se price-fixing
violation.84 The plaintiffs in Dagher waived any Rule of Reason
claim; as a result, the only issue before the Court concerned the
applicability of per se liability.8 5 Not only did the Court have no
occasion to address the application of the Rule of Reason-or of
any immunity from Rule of Reason scrutiny-but the Court ex-
pressly declined to address an argument for single-entity immunity,
and expressly indicated that the antitrust plaintiffs there could have
"challenged [the price-setting policy] pursuant to the rule of rea-
son."86 The single sentence in Dagher referring to "core activity" of
the joint venture said only that such activities were not within the
scope of the ancillary restraints doctrine, not that they were exempt
from Rule of Reason scrutiny.87
83. Mr. Keyte's example of agreement on a player salary cap, for instance,
hardly qualifies as obviously satisfying the Rule of Reason. Indeed, player restraints
have previously been held to violate the Rule of Reason. See e.g., McNeil v. Nat'l
Football League, 790 F. Supp. 871 (D. Minn 1992).
84. 547 U.S. at 8 (holding that no per se violation existed when integrated
joint venture set the price of the venture's product).
85. See id. at 4 (discussing procedural posture of case).
86. Id. at 3. Some litigants have pointed to language in Dagher that draws an
analogy to price-setting by a single firm; however the language at issue related to
why a per se rule was inapplicable, not to the creation of any immunity. See, e.g., id.
at 5 ("Price fixing agreements between two or more competitors ... are per se
unlawful. These cases do not present such an agreement . . . ."). The Court
merely equated the price-setting in Dagher with the price-setting in Broadcast Music,
see id. at 5-8-and the Court in Broadcast Music made clear that that price-setting
"plainly involve[d] concerted action" subject to section 1 scrutiny. Broad. Music,
Inc. v. Columbia Broad. System, Inc., 441 U.S. 1, 10 (1979) (discussing alleged
price-setting by seller of aggregated music rights).
87. See Dagher, 547 U.S. at 7-8 (clarifying ancillary restraints doctrine in rela-
tion to a venture's setting of price for its product). The Court described the ancil-
lary restraints doctrine as addressing the validity of ajoint venture's restrictions on
the activities of individual members of the venture, indicating that the "courts
must determine whether the nonventure restriction is a naked restraint on trade,
and thus invalid, or one that is ancillary to the legitimate and competitive purposes
of the business association, and thus valid." Id. at 7.
425
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In addition, the notion that restraints like salary caps and
broadcasting restrictions can be deemed "core activities" demon-
strably misconstrues what Dagher meant by that phrase. When
Dagher referred to "the core activity of the joint venture itself" the
Court was distinguishing between the activities of the collective ven-
ture entity and the individual activities (or restraints on the activi-
ties) of the separate members of that entity-with only the activities
of the former even potentially being "core."88 Specifically, the
Court contrasted "restrictions . . . on nonventure activities" with
challenges to the "core activity of the joint venture itself," and it
used examples that made clear that "nonventure activities" meant
any activities of the individual members, no matter how closely re-
lated to the venture.89 In particular, the Court cited NCAA as an
example of "restrictions . . . on nonventure activities," and the re-
strictions at issue in NCAA were restrictions on NCAA members'
broadcasting of their NCAA college football games.90 In short,
Dagher's notion of "core activity" by definition excludes all restraints
on the individual conduct of joint venture members.9'
Finally, the suggestion that "American Needle indicates that any
such core restrictions could be approved on a 'quick look,'"92 can-
not withstand scrutiny. American Needle's approval of "quick look"
scrutiny is limited to the traditional circumstances in which such
scrutiny is applicable: those in which the Rule of Reason can "'be
applied in the twinkling of an eye.'" 9 3 Nothing in American Needle
suggests that "quick look" might be extended to other circum-
stances, in which-rather than being a shortcut used where the
proper result under the Rule of Reason is obvious without need for
extended analysis-"quick look" is cited as a means to avoid apply-
ing the Rule of Reason at all.
88. See id. at 7 (emphasis added) (distinguishing core activity of collective ven-
ture entity from separate members of such entity).
89. See id. at 7-8 (2005) (discussing nonventure activities).
90. Id. at 7. Notably, this categorization of the broadcast restrictions in NCAA
as "restrictions ... on nonventure activities" rather than "core activity of the joint
venture itself" is inconsistent with Mr. Keyte's suggestion that "broadcast restric-
tions" can be deemed immune "core functions" under Dagher. Id.
91. Even were Dagher not so clear on this point, it is hard to conceive of a
justification for a broad definition of "core activity" that would make a large cate-
gory of joint venture restraints-independent of any apparent economic justifica-
tion-per se lawful under the antitrust laws. Dagher itself certainly does not
articulate any theory under which anything that might be labeled as "core" should
automatically be deemed permissible.
92. See Keyte, supra note 11, at 51-52.
93. Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 130 S. Ct. 2201, 2217 (2010)
(quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 109 n.39).
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Indeed, the notion that there is something particularly note-
worthy in American Needle's suggestion that defendants can win a
"quick look" victory-or that this language heralds any departure
from established, competition-centric doctrine-is puzzling. De-
fendants have always been able to obtain the equivalent of a "quick
look" victory when a plaintiff raises no plausible claim of an anti-
trust violation; indeed, many cases in which motions to dismiss anti-
trust complaints are granted can fairly be described as ones in
which the Rule of Reason was applied "'in the twinkling of an eye."'
And American Needle's related observation that restraints that "'are
essential if the product is to be available at all"' are "likely to survive
the Rule of Reason"94 says nothing new. As long ago as Broadcast
Music and NCAA, the Court clearly stated that restraints of this sort,
such as sports league "rules defining the conditions of the contest,"
were presumptively "procompetitive."95
In short, American Needle's discussion of why "[f]ootball teams
that need to cooperate are not trapped by antitrust law"96 merely
demonstrates-using well-settled principles-that the applicability
of the Rule of Reason does not portend a dystopia in which the
Monday Night Football schedule and the standard of review for in-
stant-replay challenges are governed by antitrust consent decrees.
Absent an argument that all "core activities" ofjoint ventures are so
inherently procompetitive as to pass Rule of Reason muster "in the
twinkling of an eye"-an argument I have yet to see attempted,
probably for good reason 97-there is simply no support in American
Needle for Mr. Keyte's notion that "core activities" of joint ventures
are automatically valid.
C. The Argument For Immunizing Restraints On Competition
With The Venture
I should also briefly address yet another subversive idea offered
by Mr. Keyte: the suggestion that Dagher has created another immu-
nity, making it per se legal for a joint venture to adopt restraints
"preclud[ing] a venture member from competing against the ven-
ture."98 While Dagher does contain language suggesting that ancil-
94. Id. at 2216 (quoting NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101).
95. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 117. See Broad. Music, 441 U.S. at 23 ("Joint ventures
and other cooperative arrangements are also not usually unlawful ... where the
agreement . . . is necessary to market the product at all.").
96. Am. Needle, 130 S. Ct. at 2216.
97. A persuasive version of such an argument is hard to imagine, particularly
if "core" is defined so elastically as to include such matters as player salary caps.
98. Keyte, supra note 11, at 53.
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lary restraints are automatically legal, the case does not say that a
restraint against competing with the venture is necessarily an ancil-
lary restraint.99 In fact, the law is authoritatively to the contrary:
absent convincing justification, venture members must be left free
to compete with the venture.100 As the Court stated in NCAA,
"[e]nsuring that individual members of a joint venture are free to
increase output has been viewed as central in evaluating the com-
petitive character of joint ventures."101 To be sure, there are un-
doubtedly situations in which preventing venture members from
competing with the venture can be justified as procompetitive, but
this-as always-is a matter for proof, not for an a priori immunity
exempting such restraints without regard to their competitive
effects.
V. CONCLUSION
American Needle should put an end to the argument that a
sports league is a single entity immune from antitrust scrutiny.
More generally, American Needle reinforces the need to view skepti-
cally any argument purporting to define a zone of conduct as auto-
matically lawful without regard to its competitive effects.
99. The correctness of the proposition that ancillary restraints are automati-
cally lawful is dubious, but the Court's statement to that effect is, at worst, dicta.
100. See, e.g. United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 344 F.3d 229, 242 (2d Cir.
2003) ("Far from being 'presumptively legal,' such arrangements [not to compete
with the venture] are exemplars of the type of anticompetitive behavior prohibited
by the Sherman Act.").
101. NCAA, 468 U.S. 85, 115 (1984). In Broadcast Music "each individual re-
mained free to sell his own music without restraint." Id. at 114.
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